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Note
"Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding
Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual
Assaults Committed by Their Employees
Rochelle Rubin Weber
A police officer observes a woman shoplift a package of cig-
arettes. He follows her outside to the parking lot where he
identifies himself. He is in uniform, armed, and has a badge.
Although he does not immediately arrest her, the officer tells
the woman that he must take her to the police station. Instead
of taking her to the station, he drives to an abandoned spot in
the woods, where he rapes her. The woman can pursue crimi-
nal charges and can bring a civil action against the officer per-
sonally. Can she also hold the officer's employer liable under
the doctrine of respondeat superior?' The answer depends, in
large part, on the state where the rape occurred.2
Respondeat superior is a common law doctrine that holds
1. Respondeat superior, a form of vicarious liability, is defined as "[l]et
the master answer." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIoNARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990). This
means that under certain circumstances, the "master," or employer, is liable
for the wrongful acts of the "servant," or employee. Id
2. For instance, many courts, often as a matter of law, find employers
not liable for sexual assaults committed by employees. See, e.g., Rabon v.
Guardsmark, 571 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir.) (applying South Carolina law to a
rape committed by a private security officer), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978);
City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1965) (ap-
plying Florida law to a sexual assault committed by a police officer); Gutierrez
v. Thorne, 537 A.2d 527, 530-31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (applying Connecticut
law to a sexual assault committed by a Department of Mental Retardation em-
ployee); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485 N.E.2d 409, 412-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (apply-
ing Illinois law to a sexual assault committed by a grocery store security
guard).
A number of other courts, however, have found employer liability for sex-
ual assaults committed by employees. See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 805
F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Washington law to a sexual en-
counter between a counselor and a patient); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles,
814 P.2d 1341, 1349-52 (Cal. 1991) (applying California law to a rape by a police
officer); Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119, 121-22 (La. Ct.
App. 1979) (applying Louisiana law to a rape committed by a police officer).
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employers liable for the torts of employees that occur within
the employee's "scope of employment."'3 Courts differ, though,
in their interpretation of what "scope of employment" encom-
passes, particularly as applied to sexual assaults.4 The tradi-
tional view is that sexual assault is either personally motivated
or so unusual that it is outside of the assailant's scope of em-
ployment.5 Recently, however, courts have shown an increased
willingness to apply respondeat superior to sexual assaults,
holding employers vicariously liable for sexual assaults commit-
ted by police officers, 6 therapists,7 a state national guard
3. The concept of "scope of employment" was developed to protect em-
ployers from absolute liability. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 22 (1916).
The Restatement (Second) of Agency defines "scope of employment" more nar-
rowly than do many states:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but
only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space
limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the
master;, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another,
the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time
or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). For a description of factors
to be considered in determining whether the employee's conduct is "inciden-
tal" to the conduct authorized, see id. § 229 ('To be within the scope of em-
ployment, conduct must be of the same general nature as that authorized, or
incidental to the conduct authorized.").
4. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., Donaldson, 348 F.2d at 202; Grimes v. B.F. Saul Co., 47 F.2d
409, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1931); Rawling v. City of New Haven, 537 A.2d 439, 444
(Conn. 1988); Sharples v. State, 793 P.2d 175, 177 (Haw. 1990); Bates v. Doria,
502 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Bozarth v. Harper Creek Bd. of Educ.,
288 N.W.2d 424, 425-26 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); Smothers v. Welch & Co. House
Furnishing Co., 274 S.W. 678, 679 (Mo. 1925); Desotelle v. Continental Casualty
Co., 400 N.W.2d 524, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 407 N.W.2d 560
(Wis. 1987); see also infra notes 33-34 (identifying additional cases where em-
ployers were not held liable for the sexual assaults committed by their
employees).
6. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1352; Applewhite, 380 So. 2d at 121-22; see also
White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that a rape committed by a sheriff could be within his scope of employment
because use of authority was incidental to his duties).
7. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986);
see also Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348-49 (Alaska 1990)
(determining that sexual misconduct by a counselor was not outside the scope
of his employment as a matter of law); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psy-
chiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 310-11 (Minn. 1982) (recognizing that
sexual misconduct by a psychologist can be within the scope of employment).
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recruiting officer,8 a deliveryman,9 and a hospital nursing
assistant.'0
This Note provides a framework for determining when em-
ployers should be held vicariously liable for sexual assaults
committed by their employees. Although this Note primarily
considers public sector employers,:" the framework is equally
applicable to private sector employers. Part I provides a histor-
ical overview of respondeat superior. Part II reviews the man-
ner in which courts currently apply the "scope of employment"
requirement to sexual assaults and demonstrates that a few
courts have recently expanded the notion of "scope of employ-
ment" in the context of sexual assaults. Part III establishes
that the traditional approaches taken by courts often entail
mechanical application of a test that is based on antiquated
standards. These mechanical applications undermine the un-
derlying principles of respondeat superior. This Note concludes
by suggesting that under respondeat superior, employers should
be liable when sexual assaults by their employees result from
the exercise of authority, power, or access that is created by the
job.
I. THE EVOLUTION AND CONTINUED VIABILITY OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONS OF
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Under respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicari-
ously. liable for the tortious acts of an employee.'2 The common
8. See Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
9. See Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
10. See Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 594 So. 2d 571, 574 (La. Ct.
App. 1992).
11. See infra note 66.
12. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 69 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]; see P.S. ATIYAH, VIcAR-
IOUs LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 3-5 (1967) (discussing the distinction be-
tween personal and vicarious liability); Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of
Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 564-81 (1988) (contrasting
personal and vicarious liability). For discussion of the general development of
vicarious liability, see ATIYAH, supra; BATY, supra note 3; 3 WILLIAM S.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 306-11 (1909); 8 id. at 472-79 (2d ed.
1937); WILLiAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 320-23 (2d ed.
1932); O.W. Holmes, Jr., Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891); Warren A. Sea-
vey, Speculations as to "Reondeat Superio," in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
433, 450 (1934); Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REv. 444
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law standard for determining vicarious liability has vacillated
over the centuries, moving back and forth between almost abso-
lute liability and virtually no liability.13 In the doctrine's earli-
est formulation,14 the employer was held absolutely liable in a
variety of contexts. For example, an owner of a slave or an
animal that caused harm was absolutely liable.15 English com-
mon law reacted to 'such strict accountability by moving to the
opposite extreme. By the sixteenth century the employer was
held liable for his servants' actions only if he had specifically
commanded them to act.' 6 Under the command standard the
owner was rarely liable.'7 As the eighteenth century neared,
however, courts recognized an implied command to act,'8 and
(1923); John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7
HARV. L. REV. 315, 383, 441 (1894).
13. Professor Wigmore described the endeavors of courts to use various
distinctions to assign responsibility for tortious conduct as "standing] for an
attempt (as yet more or less incomplete) as a rationalized adjustment of legal
rules to considerations of fairness and social policy." Wigmore, supra note 12,
at 316.
14. Legal historians are not in full agreement on the origins of vicarious
liability in Anglo-American law. See Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability,
28 TUL. L. REV. 161, 164 (1954). Holmes thought that the doctrine of vicarious
liability originated from Roman law notions that the owner surrenders the of-
fending object or slave. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 9, 15-20
(Little, Brown & Co. 1938) (1881). Wigmore, on the other hand, traced the
doctrine to Germanic times, Wigmore, supra note 12, at 315-16, although both
he and Holdsworth viewed the modern doctrine as rooted in policy. See id; 8
HOLDswORTH, supra note 12, at 478. Standing apart is Thomas Baty, who be-
lieved that the doctrine appeared in English law in the late 17th century, and
that it was without ancient roots. BATY, supra note 3, at 9.
15. Wigmore, supra note 12, at 315, 317-18.
16. BATY, supra note 3, at 9; Wigmore, supra note 12, at 383-92; see 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, at 306-11; 8 ic at 472-82 (reviewing the historical
development of vicarious liability); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 69,
at 500.
17. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 69, at 500.
18. WALSH, supra note 12, at 322. Writing from 1765 to 1769, Blackstone
observed that "the master is answerable for the act of his servant, if done by
his command, either expressly given, or implied." 1 WU.LAiM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *429; see also id. at *430
("[W]hatever a servant is permitted to do in the usual course of his business, is
equivalent to a general command.").
Although the "implied command" standard increased the scope of the em-
ployer's liability, the employer continued to escape liability in a wide range of
circumstances. For example, intentional torts were not covered by the "im-
plied command" standard. "Early American cases, following the old common
law rule, imposed vicarious liability on a master basdd on the fiction of an 'im-
plied command.' The effect was to deny vicarious liability for intentional torts
of servants because it could not be implied that such acts were authorized." J.
Terry Griffith, Note, Respondeat Superior and the Intentional Tort: A Short
1516 [Vol. 76:1513
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from this standard developed the modem rule that an em-
ployer is liable for her employees' tortious acts if they are
within the course,'or scope, of employment.19
As the modern standard for imposing liability under re-
spondeat superior, "scope of employment" lends itself to a
number of interpretations.20 Although courts may use varying
language, they usually find acts to be within the scope of em-
ployment if the employee was motivated to serve the em-
ployer's interest rather than the employee's personal interest,
the employer could foresee the employee's action, or some com-
bination of these factors. 2'
The modem "scope of employment" rule is plagued by the
Discourse on How to Make Assault and Battery a Part of the Job, 45 U. CIN. L.
REV. 235, 235 n.1 (1976).
19. Wigmore, supra note 12, at 399-402. The master
may frequently be answerable for his servant's misbehavior, but never
can shelter himself from punishment by laying the blame on his
agent. The reason of this is still uniform and the same; that the
wrong done by the servant is looked upon in law as the wrong of the
master himself; and it is a standing maxim, that no man shall be al-
lowed to make any advantage of his own wrong.
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 18, at *432 (footnote omitted); see WALSH, supra
note 12, at 322-23.
The first reported case to advance the general principle that the master is
liable for the tortious acts of his servants that occur within the scope of em-
ployment was Hem v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709). In Hem, the em-
ployer, a silk merchant, was held vicariously liable for an unauthorized,
intentional tort committed by an employee who had fraudulently represented
the silk as being of better quality than it was. Id Chief Justice Holt reasoned
that someone had to be the loser as a result of the deceit, and it was better to
place that burden on the employer, who hired and entrusted the agent, than
on the stranger. Id But see BATY, supra note 3, at 9-14 (arguing that the tort
claim in Hem was intertwined with a contract claim, and criticizing the use of
the "course of employment" standard that evolved from the case). Historians
agree that "the modem phase of the doctrine stems from dicta of Lord Holt."
James, supra note 14, at 165.
20. Prosser describes the term "scope of employment" as "a highly indefi-
nite phrase" that is "so devoid of meaning in itself that its very vagueness has
been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexibility in decisions."
PROSsER AND KETON, supra note 12, § 70, at 502.
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958). The standard
for imposing liability based on respondeat superior varies by state. In Utah,
for example, there are three criteria for imposing liability: the employee's
conduct must be of the general kind she is employed to perform, it must occur
within the hours and spatial boundaries of the employment, and it must be
motivated, at least in part, to serve the employer's interest. See Birkner v. Salt
Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). In Minnesota, the standard
for intentional torts is that "'an employer is liable for an assault by his em-
ployee when the source of the attack is related to the duties of the employee
and . . .occurs within work related limits of time and place."' Marston v.
Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Minn.
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same problem as was its progenitors: where to draw the line
between no and absolute liability on the part of the employer.22
Courts continue to struggle with this issue, and have espoused a
wide variety of views on what is within the reach of "scope of
employment." 23 Because courts have had such difficulty deter-
mining what respondeat superior should encompass, it is help-
ful to consider the underlying justification for the doctrine.
B. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR IS A DELIBERATE ALLOCATION OF
RISK
The modern justification4 for respondeat superiors is that
1982) (quoting Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn.
1973)). Motivation to serve the employer is not a factor. 1d.
22. See BATY, supra note 3, at 81 ("Judges oscillate between the notion
that an illegal thing resembling the lawful things that a servant was employed
to do must necessarily be within the scope of his functions, and the view...
that to do an illegal thing is evidently to step outside his employment.").
23. See Seavey, supra note 12, at 453, 465 n.49 (arguing that "scope of em-
ployment" is a malleable term that is used by courts, when convenient, to hold
employers liable); Jeffrey A. Burns, Comment, Employer Liability for As-
saults by Employees, 48 Mo. L. REv. 655, 656 (1983).
24. The historical justifications for respondeat superior are numerous.
For example, one justification relates to notions of an employer's "control"
over the conduct of the employee. See Holmes, supra note 12, at 347 ("[I]t is
plain good sense to hold people answerable for wrongs which they have inten-
tionally brought to pass, and to recognize that it is just as possible to bring
wrongs to pass through free human agents as through slaves, animals, or natu-
ral forces."); see also ATIYAH, supra note 12, at 15-17 (discussing the effect of
respondeat superior on accident prevention, because the employer is in the
best position to take precautionary measures). Another reason for employer
liability is that the employer derives benefits or profits from the employee's
actions. See BATY, supra note 3, at 32; see also Glanville Williams, Vicarious
Liability and the Master's Indemnity, 20 MOD. L. REv. 220, 230 (1957) ("Just
as liability for damage can be equitably balanced against the defendant's fault,
so it can be equitably balanced against his benefit."). Similarly, scholars have
justified the doctrine on the basis that the employer has chosen and trusted
the employee, and thus should suffer for his misbehavior. See Holmes, supra
note 12, at 348. Respondeat superior has also been applied because the em-
ployer started the occurrence and is responsible for what follows. See Harold
J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 109 (1916). An-
other reason for employer liability may be that she has "deep pockets" and is
able to pay. See BATY, supra note 3, at 154 (stressing deep pockets as the "real
reason" that employers are held liable).
25. No general purpose for respondeat superior, other than perhaps the
achievement of justice, has been agreed upon. This has led commentators to
conclude that the doctrine must continue to endure because of its appeal to no-
tions of justice:
It is difficult to believe, however, that a principle opposed to common
sense should have existed so long and still be so vigorous.... [I]t may
be noted that basic concepts are the most difficult to express, and that
lack of power of expression often leads to specious reasons for sound
1518 [Vol. 76:1513
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employers should bear all the costs that result from the risks of
their enterprises.2 6 The employer is not held liable simply be-
cause he can distribute the losses, "but because he also embod-
ies in one person all the other criteria of responsibility.
Normally it is he who selects the servant, he who controls the
work and gets the profits, his would usually be the deeper
pocket, and it is he whose work is being done."' 7 Thus, it is just
for employers, rather than innocent victims, to bear the cost of
results. The fact that... the rule is constantly expanding without
meeting substantial opposition during a time of searching analysis and
self-revelation, is some evidence that it does not greatly depart from
the common feeling of justice which it is the primary function of the
law to satisfy.
Seavey, supra note 12, at 434.
Thomas Baty, however, has criticized the doctrine of respondeat superior
as insupportable because "[a] doctrine which is accounted for on nine different
grounds may reasonably be suspected of resting on no very firm basis of pol-
icy." BATY, supra note 3, at 148. In response to Baty's criticism, Professor
Smith argues that it is the cumulative effect of the different justifications that
must be considered-
[Why should a doctrine that has nine reasons to sustain it, assuming
they are not mutually antagonistic, be less rather than more securely
anchored than a doctrine that has only one? The sounder practice,
though more difficult, in law as in extra-legal affairs, is to consider
the cumulative effect of many reasons for a rule, or, indeed, to bal-
ance the cumulative effects of many reasons for and against.
Bryant Smith, Cumulative Reasons and Legal Method, 27 TEx. L. REV. 454, 468(1949); see also ATIYAH, supra note 12, at 15-22 (criticizing Baty for failing to
appreciate the significance of the justifications when considered together);
Williams, supra note 24, at 231 (arguing that the value of the doctrine is not
defeated simply because it "is the creation of many judges who have had dif-
ferent ideas of its justification or social policy, or no idea at all").
26. PROSSER AND KEMON, supra note 12, § 69, at 500. Respondeat supe-
rior is "a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk." i; see Laski, supra
note 24, at 111. Vicarious liability is recognized as a method of loss distribu-
tion. See Smith, supra note 12, at 444. According to Dean Smith, it is "socially
more expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the community
the losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of in-
dustry than to cast the loss upon a few." I& at 456; see O.W. Holmes, Jr., The
Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897). Holmes stated that
the inclination of a very large part of the community is to make cer-
tain classes of persons insure the safety of those with whom they
deal.... The torts with which our courts are kept busy to-day [sic]
are mainly the incidents of certain well known business.... The lia-
bility for them is estimated, and sooner or later goes into the price
paid by the public.
Id. at 466-67; see also Laski, supra note 24, at 112 ("If that employer is com-
pelled to bear the burden of his servant's torts even when he is himself per-
sonally without fault, it is because in a social distribution of profit and loss, the
balance of least disturbance seems thereby best to be obtained.").
27. Smith, supra note 25, at 466.
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employee torts28 because the employers derive profits from ex-
posing others to the risk-creating activities of their employees;
employers are in a better position to absorb and distribute costs
and shift them to society;30 and holding employers liable pro-
vides an incentive for exercising care in choosing, training, and
supervising employees.3 '
II. "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" AND SEXUAL
ASSAULTS
Courts diverge sharply on whether sexual assault can be
within the scope of employment.3 2 Many jurisdictions focus on
the personal nature of sexual assaults,33 or the unexpected and
28. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 69, at 500. Glanville Williams
explained:
It is commonly felt that when a person is injured (particularly when
the injury is a bodily one), he ought to be able to obtain recompense
from someone; and if the immediate tortfeasor cannot afford to pay,
then he is justified in looking around for the nearest person of sub-
stance who can plausibly be identified with the disaster.
Williams, supra note 24, at 232.
29. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 69, at 500.
30. Id.; see Seavey, supra note 12, at 450 ('The bald statement that the
master should pay because he can pay may have little more than class appeal
.... [but] it is not unjust to have the burden of misfortune shared by those
who benefit from the work in the course of which liability occurs.").
31. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 69, at 501; James, supra
note 14, at 168 (Employers "are among those strategically placed to promote
accident prevention in connection with their operations.... Pressure of legal
liability on the employer therefore is pressure put in the right place to avoid
accidents."); Seavey, supra note 12, at 448 ("[R]espondeat superior results in
greater care in the selection and instruction of servants than would be used
otherwise.... Because of this financial liability, it appears safe to assume that
an employer can and does bring a pressure to bear upon his employees .... ").
32. For articles examining how particular states address sexual assaults
and scope of employment, see Burns, supra note 23 (discussing Missouri law);
Cliona M. Robb, Note, Bad Samaritans Make Dangerous Precedent The Perils
of Holding an Employer Liable for an Employee's Sexual Misconduct, 8
ALASKA L. REv. 181 (1991) (reviewing Alaska's treatment of sexual miscon-
duct by therapists); Christine W. Young, Comment, Respondeat Superior:. A
Clariftcation and Broadening of the Current "Scope of Employment" Test, 30
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 599 (1990) (reviewing California law). For articles fo-
cusing specifically on the liability of churches, see Jill Fedje, Note, Liability
for Sexual Abuse: The Anomalous Immunity of Churches, 9 LAw & INEQ. J.
133 (1990); Stephanie D. Young, Student Work, Sexual Molestation Within
America's Parishes and Congregations; Should the Church Be 'Thy Priest's
Keeper'?, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (1989).
33. See Doe v. United States, 769 F.2d 174, 175 (4th Cir. 1985) (employer
not liable for sexual misconduct of an Air Force social worker because he was
"acting for his personal gratification"); Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366,
370 (4th Cir. 1984) (employer not liable under South Carolina law for sexual
1520 [Vol. 76:1513
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misconduct of a counselor); Rabon v. Guardsmark, 571 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th
Cir.) (employer not liable for a rape by a private security guard), cert denied,
439 U.S. 866 (1978); City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 203
(5th Cir. 1965) (employer not liable under Florida law for an assault and rape
committed by a police officer); Grimes v. B.F. Saul Co., 47 F.2d 409, 410 (D.C.
Cir. 1931) (apartment building owner not liable for an attempted rape of a ten-
ant by an employee who gained access to the apartment to conduct an inspec-
tion); Hunter v. Countryside Ass'n for the Handicapped, 710 F. Supp. 233, 239
(N.D. Ill. 1989) (no employer liability for rape and beating by an employee be-
cause "sexual assault cannot be interpreted as furthering Countryside's busi-
ness"); Dockter v. Rudolf Wolff Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Ill.
1988) (employer not liable because an employee's "sexual misbehavior was
committed entirely for his own enjoyment and benefit; he neither intended to
nor did benefit" his employer), qff'd, 913 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1990); Valdez v.
Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 610 (W.D. Tex. 1988) (employer
not liable for a sexual assault committed by a team leader because it was per-
sonal and not in furtherance of the employer's business); Padilla v. d'Avis, 580
F. Supp. 403, 408-09 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (health facility not liable for a sexual as-
sault by a physician during a gynecological exam); Doe v. Swift, 570 So. 2d
1209, 1213 (Ala. 1990) (state not liable for a sexual assault by a psychologist of
an involuntarily committed patient because the assault was personal and thus
not within the scope of employment); Hendley v. Springhill Memorial Hosp.,
575 So. 2d 547, 550-51 (Ala. 1990) (employer not liable for an unauthorized vag-
inal exam performed by a physical therapy service vendor because it was per-
sonally motivated and a "gross deviation" from the employee's duties); Jeffrey
Scott E. v. Central Baptist Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128, 130 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(church not liable for a sexual assault by a Sunday school teacher because the
employee "was not employed to molest young boys.... [The employee's] acts
were independent, self-serving pursuits unrelated to church activities."); Rita
M. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685, 690 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(church not liable for the sexual misconduct of a priest); Alma W. v. Oakland
Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal. Rptr. 287, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (school not liable
for the sexual assault of a student by a janitor); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763
P.2d 275, 287 (Colo. 1988) (archdiocese not liable for the sexual misconduct of a
priest during marriage counseling); Rawling v. City of New Haven, 537 A.2d
439, 444 (Conn. 1988) (city need not indemnify a police officer for costs of de-
fending himself against a sexual assault charge which was dismissed, noting
that "sexual assault is generally viewed as foreign to the scope of employ-
ment"); Gutierrez v. Thorne, 537 A.2d 527, 530-31 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (De-
partment of Mental Retardation not liable for a rape of a retarded client
committed by an employee); Boykin v. District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562
(D.C. 1984) (city not liable for a program coordinator's sexual assault of a
blind, deaf, and mute student); Duyser v. School Bd., 573 So. 2d 130, 131-32
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (school not liable for sexual abuse of students by a
teacher); Big Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d
241, 243 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (no liability for the sexual abuse of child by a vol-
unteer); Randi F. v. High Ridge YMCA, 524 N.E.2d 966, 969, 971 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988) (employer not liable for a sexual assault of a three-year-old by a day care
teacher's aide); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485 N.E.2d 409, 412-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
(supermarket not liable for a sexual assault of a young girl that was commit-
ted by a security guard); Hoover v. University of Chicago Hosps., 366 N.E.2d
925, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (hospital not liable when a doctor raped a patient);
Smothers v. Welch & Co. House Furnishing Co., 274 S.W. 678, 679 (Mo. 1925)
(employer not liable for attempted rape by a furniture store employee because
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extraordinary nature of such assaults,34 to determine that em-
ployers cannot be held liable. Recently, however, some courts
have taken a broader view of what "scope of employment" en-
tails by concentrating on whether the assault occurred as a re-
sult of job-created power or authority.1 These courts have
the employee was "pursuing his own ends for his own purposes"); Cosgrove v.
Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 848-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (employer not
liable for sexual misconduct of a therapist), aff'd, 522 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super. CL
App. Div. 1987); Heindel v. Bowery Savings Bank, 525 N.Y.S.2d 428, 428-29
(App. Div. 1988) (employer not liable for a sexual assault of a teenage girl by a
security guard); Noto v. St. Vincent's Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 537 N.Y.S.2d 446,
449 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (hospital not liable for a psychiatrist's sexual misconduct),
aff'd, 559 N.Y.S.2d 510 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 565 N.E.2d 1269 (N.Y. 1990);
Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (N.C. 1990) (school not liable for a sexual
assault of a student by the school principal); Taylor v. Doctors Hosp. (West),
486 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (hospital not liable for a sexual as-
sault of a patient by an orderly); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053,
1058 (Utah 1989) (employer not liable for a social worker's sexual misconduct
with a patient because it was not motivated by a desire to serve the employer);
Blenheim v. Dawson & Hall Ltd., 667 P.2d 125,129 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (em-
ployer not liable for the rape of a dancer at a party on the employer's con-
struction site); Olson v. Connerly, 457 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Wis. 1990) (employer
not liable for the sexual contact between a physician and a patient).
34. See Bates v. United States, 701 F.2d 737, 741-42 (8th Cir. 1983) (em-
ployer not liable for rapes and murders committed by a military police officer
in light of his "outrageous and criminal" conduct); Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F.
Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. I1. 1977) (rapes by police officers were "too outrageous"
to impose liability on their employer); Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 457 (IMl.
App. Ct. 1986) (rape by a sheriff was outrageous and thus beyond the scope of
employment); Desotelle v. Continental Casualty Co., 400 N.W.2d 524, 530 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1986) (sexual assault by a sheriff was "extraordinary and discon-
nected" from contemplated services), review denied, 407 N.W.2d 560 (Wis.
1987).
35. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1369-70 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Indian Health Service liable for sexual misconduct of a counselor); Lyon v.
Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 651, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Reinstating a jury verdict against
an employer, the court recognized that deliveryman gained access to a cus-
tomer's apartment "by means of a badge of employment," but still the court
required that the rape be motivated by a business related dispute.); Doe v. Sa-
maritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1990) (reversing a summary
judgment granted to the employer on the basis that "it could reasonably be
concluded that the resulting sexual conduct was 'incidental' to the therapy"
(footnote omitted)); Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1349-52
(Cal. 1991) (reinstating a jury verdict holding an employer liable for a rape
committed by a police officer); Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School
District, 242 Cal. Rptr. 612, 620-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a suit
against a school district for a teacher's sexual abuse of a child was improperly
dismissed because "governmental entities should be held liable for the inten-
tional torts committed within the scope of employment by public employees
... who are entrusted with great authority"), opinion vacated, 262 Cal. Rptr.
303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (reconsidered in light of John R. v. Oakland Unified
Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989)); White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr.
493, 496 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a summary judgment in favor of an
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found that sexual assaults may be within the "scope of employ-
ment," and thus the employers liable, if the sexual assaults
were committed by employees through the use of job-created
power.
A. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
1. Focus on Employee Motivation
To determine the employer's liability, many courts con-
sider only the employee's motivation for acting.36 The "motiva-
tion to serve" test requires that the employee's actions be at
least partly motivated to serve the employer's business interest
in order to be within his scope of employment.3 7 Because it is
almost inconceivable that a sexual assault furthers any em-
ployer's interest, no liability results on the part of the em-
ployer. For example, in Gutierrez v. Thorne,38 the Connecticut
Department of Mental Retardation escaped liability for a male
employee's rape of one of its clients. The department had as-
employer was improper because the "employer/government must be responsi-
ble for acts done during the exercise" of authority and the "use of authority is
incidental to the duties of a police officer"); Stropes v. Heritage House Chil-
drens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Ind. 1989) (holding that a
sexual assault of a mentally retarded resident by a nurse's aide is not as a mat-
ter of law outside the scope of employment; assault must be examined in rela-
tion to the nature of the employment, which in this case included the duties of
bathing and dressing the victim); Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 594 So.
2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (holding hospital liable for a nursing assistant's
rape of a patient in a psychiatric unit); Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1296
(La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding the state liable for unauthorized physical exami-
nations performed by a state national guard recruiting officer); Applewhite v.
City of Baton Rouge, 380 So. 2d 119, 121-22 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding the
city liable for a rape committed by a police officer); Marston v. Minneapolis
Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306, 310 (Minn. 1982) (aban-
doning a "motivation to serve" test for intentional torts and remanding for a
new trial to determine if the employer should be liable for the sexual miscon-
duct of one of its psychologists); Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 385-86
(Or. Ct. App. 1989) (Finding that the plaintiff stated a cause of action against a
church for the sexual misconduct of a pastor/counselor, the court emphasized
that the misconduct was tied to abuse of the pastor's position of trust.), appeal
dismissed sub nom., Christenson v. Lutheran Memorial Church, 817 P.2d 758
(Or. 1991).
36. See supra note 33.
37. The "motivation to serve" test requires that the employee's conduct be
actuated "by a purpose to serve the master." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 228 (1958). The rationale is that if the employee is pursuing per-
sonal interests, she is not furthering the employer's business interests and
therefore is not acting within the scope of her employment. Thus, the em-
ployer is not liable.
38. 537 A.2d 527 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
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signed the employee to supervise the living conditions of the
plaintiff, a retarded woman living alone in an apartment, and
supplied him with a key to her apartment for use in emergen-
cies. 39 While on duty, the employee used the key to enter the
client's apartment and sexually assault her on four occasions,
threatening her with loss of benefits if she told anyone. The
court found no employer liability because the employee "was
not furthering the defendant's business interests when he sexu-
ally assaulted the plaintiff."4
39. Id. at 529-30. The employee's position required that he supervise the
plaintiff in such matters as 'Sow to keep her apartment, shop for her needs,
budget her expenses, and perform other aspects of daily living." Id. at 529.
40. Id. at 530. The court further stated that the employee "was engaging
in criminal conduct which had no connection to the defendant's business of
providing supervision and training to mentally retarded persons regarding
daily living skills." Id
A number of other courts have similarly allowed the employer to escape
liability by focusing on whether the employee was motivated to serve the em-
ployer. In City of Green Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197 (5th Cir.
1965), a police officer raped a woman he had stopped for speeding. Although
the police officer was on duty, in uniform, and the rape occurred in a police
car, the court found that the officer "stepped aside from his employment to
accomplish his own, rather than the City's purpose," and thus the city was not
liable. Id at 203; see also Rabon v. Guardsmark, 571 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4th Cir.)
(employer not liable because a private security guard was furthering his in-
dependent purpose when he assaulted and raped the plaintiff at a building he
was hired to protect), cert denied, 439 U.S. 866 (1978); Webb v. Jewel Cos., 485
N.E.2d 409, 412-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (supermarket was not liable for sexual
molestation by its security guard on its premises because the assault was a
"deviation having no relation to the business of Jewel or the furtherance
thereof"); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 520 A.2d 844, 848-49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) (a sexual relationship between a therapist and a patient was outside
the scope of employment because it was not the type of conduct the therapist
was employed to perform, went beyond authorized space limits, and was "too
little actuated by a purpose to serve the master"), aff'd, 522 A.2d 483 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
The court in Rawling v. City of New Haven, 537 A.2d 439 (Conn. 1988),
conceded that, under certain circumstances, an assault can occur within the
scope of employment, but it noted that "an assault can also be viewed as a per-
sonal frolic unwarranted by the work environment." Id. at 444 (citations omit-
ted). The court then addressed sexual assaults, finding that they are
"generally viewed as foreign to the scope of employment." 1d.
In Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court required that a
sexual assault be motivated by a business-related dispute in order to hold the
employer liable. In Lyon, a deliveryman raped a customer's representative af-
ter arguing over the method of delivery and payment. Id. at 651-52. The court
held that the employer would be liable only if the assault was "triggered off or
motivated" by a dispute over the employer's business and not the result of the
employee's "propinquity and lust." Id. at 655. The court reinstated the jury
verdict holding the trucking company liable. Id.
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2. Focus on the Outrageousness of Sexual Assaults
A number of courts have held that if the employee's con-
duct is outrageous, it is necessarily outside the scope of employ-
ment.41 Consequently, the employer is not held liable. For
example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bates v.
United States,42 declined to hold the United States government
liable for the actions of an on-duty military policeman who
stopped, raped, and murdered teenagers on a military base.43
The court found that the federal government was not liable be-
cause the military policeman's actions were "so outrageous and
criminal-so excessively violent as to be totally without reason
or responsibility."44
3. Focus on Policy Reasons
The California Supreme Court has looked to respondeat
superior's justifications in recent sexual assault cases. In John
R v. Oakland Unified School District,45 the court recognized
41. See supra note 34. According to the "outrageous conduct" rule, "[t]he
fact that the employee has acted in an outrageous manner is evidence that he
departed from the scope of employment." Bates v. Doria, 502 N.E.2d 454, 457
(ill. App. Ct. 1986).
42. 701 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1983).
43. The military policeman had authority to detain civilians and make ar-
rests, was driving a military police vehicle that was clearly marked, was in full
uniform, and was issued a United States Army pistol and ammunition. Id, at
739. The officer stopped a civilian vehicle carrying four teenagers, handcuffed
the two male teenagers, placed them in the back seat of his military jeep, and
shot both of them through the chest. Id He next ordered the two female
teenagers into his jeep, drove them to a cabin, raped them, and then shot
them. Id. at 739-40.
44. Id at 741-42. Similarly, in Desotelle v. Continental Casualty Co., 400
N.W.2d 524 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986), review denied, 407 N.W.2d 560 (Wis. 1987),
the county was not held liable for the sexual assault committed by an on-duty
sheriff in his squad car. The assault occurred when he brought the plaintiff to
his car to question her about underage drinking. The court wrote that it was
reasonable for the trier of fact to find that the employee's "conduct was so ex-
traordinary and disconnected from the type of services ordinarily contem-
plated that it was done outside the scope of his employment." Id. at 530.
Some courts use the "outrageousness" test in conjunction with the "moti-
vation to serve" test. These courts reason that if the employee's conduct is
outrageous, then she could not have been motivated to serve her employer,
and no specific inquiry of motivation is necessary. See, e.g., Gambling v. Cor-
nish, 426 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. IM. 1977) (employees' actions were outra-
geous and were motivated "solely by a desire to gratify their personal
interests"); Dora, 502 N.E.2d at 457 (reasoning that outrageous behavior is evi-
dence that the employee acted for purely personal reasons).
45. 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989). The teacher asked John R., then a junior
high school student, to participate in the school's work-experience program, in
which high-performing students assist teachers. Id- at 949. The program al-
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that respondeat superior principles could apply in a school set-
ting because of the significant authority a teacher has relative
to a child.46 Addressing a student's claim that a teacher sexu-
ally molested him, the John R. court determined that the
school district could not be held vicariously liable.47 The court
focused on the primary justification for the doctrine, risk allo-
cation, as well as two of the supporting policies, accident pre-
vention and assurance of compensation.48 The court decided
that accident prevention was inappropriate because imposing li-
ability might discourage school districts from allowing one-on-
one associations between students and teachers.49 It deter-
mined that assurance of compensation was inapplicable because
insurance would be difficult to obtain and compensating victims
might divert funds from the classroom.50 The court also rea-
soned that risk allocation was not relevant. It found that the
connection between a teacher's authority and the "abuse of that
authority to indulge in personal, sexual misconduct is simply
too attenuated" to include such abuse within the risks allocated
to a teacher's employer.5 '
lowed the required work to be done at the teacher's home where, after several
attempts, the teacher succeeded in persuading John to participate in sexual
acts. Id
46. The court stated that "[w]e agree that in the eyes of a child, a
teacher's authority can be very great." Id. at 955. The court proceeded, how-
ever, to downplay the power of a teacher over a student, stating that the
teacher's authority "is simply not great enough to persuade us that vicarious
liability should attach" for the teacher's sexual misconduct. Id at 956-57.
47. Id at 956.
48. Id at 955 (citing Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676,
678 (Cal. 1986)). Although the California Supreme Court acknowledged that
risk allocation is the primary modern justification for respondeat superior, the
court used loss distribution as a proxy for risk allocation, thereby treating risk
allocation, accident prevention, and assurance of compensation as coequal jus-
tifications. See id. at 955-56.
49. Id at 956.
50. Id
51. Id Because the California Supreme Court refused to apply respon-
deat superior, it did not address whether the conduct came within the
teacher's scope of employment. Two years later, however, the same court in
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991), found the justifica-
tions for respondeat superior applicable to a rape committed by a police of-
ficer. It applied the doctrine and reinstated a jury verdict finding the
employer liable. The plaintiff, Mary M., was driving home at approximately
2:30 a.m. when she was stopped for erratic driving by Sergeant Schroyer of the
Los Angeles Police Department. Id at 1342. Schroyer was in uniform, driving
a marked police car, and equipped with badge and gun. Id Mary M. had been
drinking, and after performing poorly on a field sobriety test, she started to
cry and begged the officer not to take her to jail. Id The officer drove her
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B. THE JOB-CREATED AUTHORITY STANDARD
In contrast, some courts have emphasized the role of job-
related power or authority to determine employer liability for
sexual assaults.52 Job-related power refers to authority or con-
trol gained through employment. For example, in Applewhite
v. City of Baton Rouge,53 the Louisiana Court of Appeals held
the City of Baton Rouge liable for a rape committed by a police
officer5 4 The court emphasized that the police officer was on
duty, armed, in uniform, and that he was "able to separate the
plaintiff from her companions because of the force and author-
ity of the position which he held."s5 The court also reasoned
that police officers, as public servants, are given "considerable
public trust and authority... [W]here excesses are committed
by such officers, their employers are held to be responsible for
home where he demanded "payment" for his leniency, and then raped her. Id
at 1342-43.
As in its opinion in John R, see 769 P.2d at 955-56, the California Supreme
Court considered the policy justifications for applying respondeat superior.
Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1343-45. In Mary M., however, the court decided that the
justifications compelled application of respondeat superior and a finding of lia-
bility. It reasoned that deterrence would be served because imposing liability
"creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard sub-
stantially against the evil to be prevented."' I at 1347 (quoting Louis Pizitz
Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)). The Mary M. court also
approved of the imposition of vicarious liability as an "appropriate method to
ensure that victims" are compensated. I& at 1348. As for the proper allocation
of risk, the court emphasized the "extraordinary power and authority" that
police officers have over residents, stating that "[i]nherent in this formidable
power is the potential for abuse." Id- at 1349. The court concluded that the
community should bear the cost of the misuse of power because of "the sub-
stantial benefits that the community derives from the lawful exercise of police
power." I& Thus, the court stressed that misuse of job-related power could
fall within the scope of employment, and the risk could be fairly allocated to
the employer. Id- at 1349-52.
52. See supra note 35. A number of courts have considered job-created
authority in the context of sexual assault cases, but they have not regarded
this issue as determinant. See, e.g., Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp. 1153,
1155 (N.D. M. 1977); John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 956-
57 (Cal. 1989).
53. 380 So. 2d 119 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
54. IM at 121. The plaintiff, Ms. Applewhite, was walking with two fe-
male friends along a highway at approximately 10:00 p.m. when she was
stopped by Officer Crowe, who was on duty, in uniform and accompanied by
Still, a corrections officer. Id, at 120. Crowe threatened to arrest the three
women for vagrancy if they were not quickly off the streets; as they hurried
toward their destination, Crowe stopped them a few blocks further. IM After
flipping a coin to determine whom he would arrest, Crowe ordered Ap-
plewhite into the police vehicle. IM He then drove her to a stadium, where he
sexually assaulted her. IM.
55. IM at 121.
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their actions even though those actions may be somewhat re-
moved from their usual duties." Thus, the Applewhite court
did not confine itself to determining whether the officers were
"motivated to serve" their employer, but instead evaluated the
role of job-created authority in making the sexual assaults pos-
sible.57 Even the California Supreme Court, despite its earlier
ruling in John R.,-9 determined in Mary M. v. City of Los Ange-
les59 that the city should be liable for a rape committed by a
police officer because of the "extraordinary power and author-
ity" police officers have over residents.6°
Although the Applewhite and Mary M. courts' reasoning
may be easiest to apply in the context of police officers, not all
courts have so limited it.61 Courts have found sexual assaults to
56. 1& The same reasoning extends to cases of excessive force by police
officers. In Cheatham v. Lee, 277 So. 2d 513 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 279
So. 2d 696 (La. 1973), an off-duty officer was hired to chaperon a school dance.
After clearing the employment with his supervisor, the officer appeared in full
uniform and armed with his pistol and a "slap jack." Id. at 514-15. The court
held the city liable for the excessive force used by the officer in breaking up
an alleged fight, stressing that the officer had filed all necessary papers and
obtained approval from his supervisor, and was in full uniform. Id at 516. Be-
cause the officer "possessed the apparent authority to represent the City in his
law enforcement capacity," the city was liable for injuries resulting "from the
tortious act of its employee while in the course and scope of his employment."
Id. at 517; see also Bourque v. Lohr, 248 So. 2d 901 (La. Ct. App. 1971) (holding
the city liable for assaults committed by off-duty police officers).
57. Applewhite, 380 So. 2d at 121-22. The California Court of Appeals sim-
ilarly imposed liability on the employer in White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). In White, a county deputy sheriff drove the
plaintiff, Ms. White, to a secluded orange grove where he allegedly threatened
to rape and murder her. Id. at 494. White alleged that the officer then drove
her around for a number of hours, continuing with his threats, and finally re-
turned her to her car when she promised to go out with him that weekend. Id
In finding that the officer's actions were "incidental to his duties" and thus
within his scope of employment, the court held that the employer, by placing
him in a position of authority, would be liable if the plaintiff's allegations
were proven. Ad at 496. Of significance to the court was White's reliance on
the officer's apparent authority: She would not have stopped, and the subse-
quent events would not have occurred, if he was not a deputy sheriff, in uni-
form, in a marked vehicle using flashing red lights. 1d. Echoing a sentiment
shared by the Arpplewhite court, the White court wrote that the county "en-
joys tremendous benefits from the public's respect for that authority. There-
fore, it must suffer the consequences when the authority is abused." Id.
58. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
59. 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991).
60. Id- at 1349.
61. The use of a "job-created power" standard is, however, fairly recent.
See Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 242 Cal. Rptr. 612
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987), opinion vacated, 262 Cal. Rptr. 303 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(reconsidered in light of John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, 769 P.2d
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be incidental to employees' duties, and therefore within the
scope of employment, when committed by a state national
guard recruiting officer,62 psychologists and therapists,as a de-
liveryman,64 and a hospital nursing assistant.65 Courts have
948 (Cal. 1989)). The Kimberly M. court noted that "the modern trend in cases
involving tortious assaults by employees [is] to define scope of employment
broadly." lI at 619 (citing Berger v. Southern Pac. Co., 300 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1956)). This trend, though heralded for many years, appears to be
slow moving. See Griffith, supra note 18, at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 245 reporter's notes, at 391 (1957)).
62. Turner v. State, 494 So. 2d 1292, 1296 (La. Ct. App. 1986). The Turner
court found that the tortious conduct of a state national guard recruiting of-
ficer, who deceived four female potential recruits into believing he was author-
ized to perform physical examinations, was incidental to his duties "although
totally unauthorized by the employer and obviously motivated by his personal
interests." Id "[Tihe risk of harm faced by the young women was fairly at-
tributable to his employer, who had placed the sergeant in a position of trust
and authority ....." Id-
63. See supra note 7. The Supreme Court of Alaska expanded its concep-
tion of scope of employment in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791 P.2d
344, 348 (Alaska 1990). Doe involved a sexual relationship between a rever-
end/doctor who was employed by the Samaritan Counseling Center, and a pa-
tient. Id. at 345. In declining to follow the courts that view tortious sexual
conduct as solely motivated by personal interest, the Doe court determined
that construing the "motivation to serve" test in this way would too severely
undermine the rationale of respondeat superior. Id. The court reasoned-
"Scope of employment" as a test for application of respondeat supe-
rior would be insufficient if it failed to encompass the duty of every
enterprise to the social community which gives it life and contributes
to its prosperity .... The basis of respondeat superior has been cor-
rectly stated as "the desire to include in the costs of operation inevita-
ble losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and
thus distribute the burden among those benefited by the enterprise."
Id. at 349 (quoting Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140-41 (Alaska 1972)).
The court found that the essential consideration is whether the "tortious
conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate
work activities." Id at 348. Applying the standard used by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986),
the Doe court stated that sexual conduct could reasonably be found to be "inci-
dental" to therapy, and remanded the case to determine how closely connected
the sexual relationship was to the misuse of the transference phenomenon.
Doe, 791 P.2d at 349.
Similarly, in Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology,
329 N.W.2d 306 (Minn. 1982), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a clinic
could be liable for a sexual relationship between a psychologist and a client.
Id at 311. The court stated that "the employee's motivation should not be a
consideration for imposition of vicarious liability." Id Rather, the key factor
is whether the assault is related to the employee's duties and "'occurs within
work related limits of time and place."' Id. at 310 (quoting Lange v. National
Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Minn. 1973)).
64. Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).




been particularly reluctant to attribute tortious conduct to the
employer, however, when the employer is a governmental
entity.w
III. TOWARD A REASONED APPROACH
A. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH THE
PRINCIPLES OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The standard for imposing liability on the employer has
gone through many transitions over the centuries. 67 From vir-
tually absolute liability on the one hand to the necessity of an
actual command on the other, courts arrived at "scope of em-
ployment" as the modem test for respondeat superior. The
"scope of employment" standard should ensure that employers
bear the costs of risks associated with their enterprises. 68 In
the context of sexual assaults, however, the doctrine's justifica-
tion is frequently undermined when courts use the "motivation
to serve" or the "outrageousness" tests to determine if actions
are within the scope of employment.
1. Employee's Motivation
Instead of using the "motivation to serve" test as a guide to
help determine whether conduct should fall within the scope of
66. See PETER H. ScHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT ch. 2 (1983) (addressing
tort immunity in the public sector, and the disparity between the public and
private sectors with respect to liability). The Federal Tort Claims Act covers
suits against the federal government. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2671-2680 (1988). It makes the government liable "in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." Id
§ 2674. There are, however, a number of exceptions relieving the government
of liability that do not similarly protect private parties. See id § 2680.
The reluctance of courts to hold municipalities liable may stem from the
concern that they are unable to pass the costs to customers in the way that
for-profit businesses can, or that liability will divert tax funds from public
objectives. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 12, § 131, at 1051-52. Gov-
ernmental entities do pass on the costs to "customers," however, in the sense
that the community of taxpayers are the customers, or beneficiaries of the
services, and costs are passed on by way of taxes. Because "[i]t is almost al-
ways agreed" that concerns over profit-making or tax fund diversion "are not
sound" reasons for allowing the government to escape liability, "there has
been a large movement to abolish the municipal immunity or to restrict it se-
verely." Id For a discussion of enterprise liability and the question of immu-
nity in the public sector, see William F. Baxter, Enterprise Liability, Public &
Private, 42 LAW & CoNTEMp. PRoBs. 45 (1978); Jerry L. Mashaw, Civil Liabil-
ity of Government Offwers, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 8 (1978).
67. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 76:15131530
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
appropriate for use in determining what conduct is within the
scope of employment, but courts should not limit the test to
narrow groups of employees, such as therapists or police of-
ficers.9 Depending on the factual setting, a social worker,
priest, or supervisor may just as easily be in a position of power
over a victim.97 Courts also have not addressed how the job-
created power standard applies to situations that involve job-
created access rather than authority, such as when an apart-
ment building manager uses a key to enter an apartment and
then rapes a tenant.
Once a court has decided to use the job-created power stan-
v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 680 (Cal. 1986) (citations omit-
ted)).
This reasoning should apply to school teachers. The control a teacher is
able to exercise over a young student is almost indistinguishable from that ex-
ercised by a police officer over an adult. "A schoolteacher alone at his home
with an impressionable child has as much power and opportunity to commit a
sexual assault against the child, especially one of tender years, as a police of-
ficer has to commit an assault against a citizen." Id. at 1361 (Baxter, J., con-
curring in the judgment). Like a police officer, a teacher is able to isolate
students and manipulate them because of job-created power and authority.
The teacher in John R. was acting within the scope of his employment when
he encouraged the student to participate in the work-experience program and
required the student to work for him at his home. It is contradictory for the
court to find that a sexual assault by a police officer is within the scope of em-
ployment, but to find differently when the assailant is a teacher. See Recent
Case, Respondeat Superior-Vicarious Liability-California Supreme Court
Holds Police Department Vicariously Liable for Rape Committed by On-Duty
Police Officer, 105 HARV. L. REV. 947 (1992) (criticizing the California
Supreme Court for not applying the standard used in Mary M. to the John R.
case).
96. Some courts may limit the job-created power standard to specific fac-
tual situations. See Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1364-66, 1368-71
(9th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that employer liability for sexual assaults may be
limited to the counseling setting because of the role transference plays); Doe v.
Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1990) (citing Simmons
with approval); Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry & Neurology, 329
N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn. 1982) (stating that sexual misconduct by a psychologist
may be within the scope of employment because it is a hazard of the profes-
sion); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 542
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that sexual abuse by a gynecologist was "inter-
twined with and inseparable from' services ordinarily provided); Mary M., 814
P.2d at 1347-49 (holding an employer liable for rape by a police officer, but re-
iterating that school districts should not be held liable for the sexual molesta-
tion of students by teachers).
97. For example, a priest may have a great deal of power over a teenager
who belongs to his parish and believes he must obey the priest for religious
reasons. Yet the same priest may have no or significantly less power over an-
other teenager who is not of the same faith and is met in a nonchurch setting,
such as at a public park or library. The degree of authority depends on the
specific factual situation.
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Furthermore, requiring the employer, or community, to in-
clude the cost of such abuse as an expense of doing business en-
sures that the loss is distributed among the beneficiaries of the
services-in the case of public employers, the community in
general. Holding employers liable also provides an incentive
for employers to exercise care in choosing, training, and super-
vising their employees, and thereby promotes prevention. If
only the employee is liable, the employer has no incentive to
take preventative measures or reform unsafe practices.9
C. REDEFINING "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" CAN RESULT IN
CONFLICTING OUTCOMES
Although a few courts have adopted the job-created power
standard, the ideas behind the approach are not fully devel-
oped. Thus, as currently applied, the standard may lead to in-
consistent results.95  The job-created power standard is
94. As Jaffe explained, "police tactics are often institutional and awards
against the state may modify institutional practices." I& at 229-30.
95. The California Supreme Court, for example, has adopted a job-created
authority standard, but applies it inconsistently. The court based its distinc-
tion between teachers in John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, 769 P.2d
948 (Cal. 1989), and police officers in Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d
1341 (Cal. 1991), on questionable grounds. Imposing liability in both situations
would encourage employers to "take measures to prevent recurrence of the
tortious conduct." See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1348. If the school district is not
liable, but only the teacher individually is liable, there is no incentive for the
school to take preventative steps.
Although the court in John R. was concerned that imposing liability on
the school district would discourage close relationships between students and
teachers, 769 P.2d at 956, schools might instead take steps to ensure the safety
of students while continuing to encourage close relationships, such as by re-
quiring that meetings occur at school during regular hours, or by requiring the
presence of a third person. Indeed, allowing the school district to escape liabil-
ity may have an effect opposite of what the court intended: If parents feel that
they cannot trust the school to ensure the safety of their children while in spe-
cial programs, parents may be unwilling to let their children participate in the
programs.
In holding that it is not appropriate to allocate the risk of a teacher's tor-
tious sexual conduct to a school district, id. at 956-57, the John R? court failed
to consider the vast amount of authority vested in teachers, the benefit the
community derives from giving that authority to teachers, and the question of
whether it is more just for the community, rather than the innocent victim, to
bear the cost. Yet allocation of risk did not trouble the court in Mary M.,
which found it "neither startling nor unexpected" that the power of police of-
ficers might be misused. 814 P.2d at 1350. The Mary M. court also indicated
that the employee's conduct as a whole should be considered, not just the tor-
tious act. Id- "[Tihe proper inquiry is not 'whether the wrongful act itself was
authorized but whether it was committed in the course of a series of acts of
the agent which were authorized by the principal.'" Id- at 1351 (quoting Perez
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rive profits by providing employees such as security guards or
apartment building managers with authority or power. If these
businesses did not grant authority to their employees, the busi-
nesses would be much more costly to operate. By bestowing au-
thority upon the employee, therefore, the employer realizes a
financial gain. Similarly in the public sector, communities
profit from the authority granted employees such as police of-
ficers or teachers.92 Communities benefit when citizens respect
the authority of police officers to stop and detain motorists or
to question witnesses in an investigation. In this way, drunken
drivers are stopped from driving, murders are solved, and the
community is a safer place to live. Similarly, communities ben-
efit from teachers having authority to control classrooms and
educate students.
Because communities derive benefits from the authority af-
forded their teachers and police officers, the communities
should bear the burden of liability when that authority is mis-
used.9 3 By allocating the costs of the enterprise to those who
benefit from the enterprise, rather than requiring the innocent
victim to absorb the full cost, courts will require employers to
pay the full cost of their enterprises and provide compensation
to the least culpable parties, the assault victims.
805 F.2d 1363, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986)). The California Supreme Court similarly
found:
In view of the considerable power and authority that police officers
possess, it is neither startling nor unexpected that on occasion an of-
ficer will misuse that authority by engaging in assaultive conduct.
The precise circumstances of the assault need not be anticipated, so
long as the risk is one that is reasonably foreseeable.
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1350 (Cal. 1991).
92. See Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1352 (" 'It is, after all, the state which puts
the officer in a position to employ force and which benefits from its use.'"
(quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Ac-
tions, 77 HARV. L. REV. 209, 229 (1963))); White, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 496 ("The
use of authority is incidental to the duties of a police officer. The County en-
joys tremendous benefits from the public's respect for that authority. There-
fore, it must suffer the consequences when the authority is abused."). Thomas
Baty argues that when a municipality is the employer, there is even more rea-
son to favor liability. BATY, supra note 3, at 195-97. "The great power wielded
by such [municipal] organizations may induce us to prefer the principle of
their responsibility in all cases. It is not merely that the municipality is pow-
erful; but it is likewise ineluctable. It confronts the private person at every
turn .... " Id at 197.
93. See Jaffe, supra note 92, at 229. "If the award is in favor of the plain-
tiff, the state should.., accept financial responsibility for the injury, whether
mere false arrest or gross brutality. It is, after all, the state which puts the
officer in a position to employ force and which benefits from its use." Id
(footnote omitted).
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foreseeable as a general risk of an enterprise.8 6
The absurdity that results from applying the "outrageous-
ness" standard is that a city might be held liable if an officer
uses excessive force to beat someone during an arrest but not if
he also rapes the person, based on the fact that the rape is more
outrageous than, and not as specifically foreseeable as, the beat-
ing.8 7 As one well-known commentator observed: "It is a curi-
ous state of affairs, in which the less badly treated a
complainant has been, the better are his prospects of getting
damages!" 88
B. FOCUSING ON THE ROLE OF JOB-CREATED POWER OR
AUTHORITY
The best way to ensure that employers bear the costs asso-
ciated with their enterprises89 is to consider the degree that
job-created power or authority assists employees in committing
sexual assaults.9° Many of the courts that have found sexual
assaults to be outside of the scope of employment have failed to
consider the benefit that employers receive from granting
power to their employees.9 ' Private employers operate and de-
86. Under respondeat superior, as contrasted with negligence, "we are not
looking for that which can and should reasonably be avoided, but with the
more or less inevitable toll of a lawful enterprise." Id. at 176.
87. See Mathurin v. Government of V.I., 398 F. Supp. 110 (D.V.I. 1975),
off'd, 527 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1976). The Mathurin court found that beatings of
prisoners by Virgin Island government officers were within the scope of the
officers' employment. Id. at 116. The court stated that "the actions of the po-
lice officers were not so outrageous and excessively violent as to be outside the
scope of their employment." Id. If the "maltreatment" had reached a "level of
outright torture or brutality," however, the officers would have been acting
outside the scope of employment. Id. Thus, while holding the employer liable
under respondeat superior for the beatings of prisoners, the court might not
have imposed liability if the assaults also included rape because of its higher
level of "brutality" or outrageousness.
88. BATY, supra note 3, at 193; see ATIYAH, supra note 12, at 201-02.
89. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
90. "'[I]t would be unjust in some circumstances to require an individual
injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his loss rather than dis-
tribute it throughout the community."' White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 493, 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary
Sch. Dist., 359 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1961)).
91. See supra notes 33-34, 36-44 and accompanying text. The fact that the
specific act of the employee does not benefit the employer should not be the
end of the inquiry. As the court in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center, 791
P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990), recognized, "'[the counselor] was employed to provide
mental health counseling and although he was not authorized to become sexu-
ally involved with his clients, that contact occurred in conjunction with his le-
gitimate counseling activities."' Id. at 348 (quoting Simmons v. United States,
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2. The "Outrageousness" Standard
The "outrageousness" standard suffers from problems simi-
lar to those of the "motivation to serve" standard in that it is
often mechanically applied. If the employee's actions are "out-
rageous," the employer escapes liability without regard to
whether the conduct should be considered to be within the
scope of employment. The result is that courts neglect the crit-
ical issue of whether the outrageous behavior is related to em-
ployment conditions or duties, thereby evading a determination
of whether the action is a risk that should be allocated to the
employer.83
When courts use the outrageousness standard, they are
asking whether the risk is foreseeable, or whether it is so unu-
sual or outrageous that it should not be characterized as part of
the job.84 Courts that use this standard often unwittingly rely
on negligence principles rather than on respondeat superior.85
Negligence focuses on what can reasonably be avoided. For ex-
ample, under a negligence standard a school district would be
liable if it hired a convicted child molester as a teacher without
investigating his background. Respondeat superior, on the
other hand, focuses on the risks of an enterprise; it is foresee-
able that a teacher may abuse his authority, even though the
precise manner in which he does so may not be specifically
foreseeable. Foreseeability is relevant to respondeat superior
only in an evaluation of what is a general foreseeable risk of a
business. Thus, that which is a reasonably foreseeable risk for
purposes of negligence is quite different from that which is
rior also provides an incentive to exercise care in hiring, training, and
supervising employees. See supra note 31.
83. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(employer not liable for rapes committed by police officers because the con-
duct was outrageous and not "expectable"); Desotelle v. Continental Casualty
Co., 400 N.W.2d 524, 530 (Wis. Ct. App. 1986) (no employer liability for a sex-
ual assault by an on-duty sheriff because such conduct "did not conform with
that required and expected of a police officer" and was "disconnected from the
type of services ordinarily contemplated"), review denied, 407 N.W.2d 560
(Wis. 1987).
85. Although "foreseeability is an expanding concept," it is clear that
"this kind of inquiry should not be involved where the question is one of vicar-
ious liability." James, supra note 14, at 175. The use of an outrageousness
standard is a limitation on vicarious liability that comes "from a narrow con-
cept of what is foreseeable, which would be appropriate enough on an issue of
the master's negligence but [is] out of place in determining the scope of his
servant's employment." Id. at 189.
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People are rarely employed to commit torts, but employers may
put employees in positions where they can do so.7 9 For exam-
ple, employing a therapist who will use transference, which
places the patient in a vulnerable position, necessarily entails
the danger of misuse and therefore should be considered a cost
of doing business. The therapist was not employed to have a
sexual relationship with the patient, but the therapist was
placed in a position by the employer where he could abuse the
patient's trust. Therefore, the risk of abuse is a cost associated
with its enterprise and the employer should be liable.8 0 The
fact that an assault is an intentional, rather than an uninten-
tional, tort is not relevant."' Either way, the employer creates
a situation where the employee can commit a tort. As a matter
of distributive justice, the employer, rather than the innocent
victim, should bear the cost, because it is the employer who
puts the employee in a position to commit an assault. Further-
more, imposing liability on the employer creates a strong incen-
tive for the employer to exercise care in training and
supervising employees. 8 2
79. The Indiana Supreme Court stated:
The fact that this was a sexual assault is not per se determinative of
the scope of employment question. A blanket rule holding all sexual
attacks outside the scope of employment as a matter of law because
they satisfy the perpetrators' personal desires would draw an unprin-
cipled distinction between such assaults and other types of crimes
which employees may commit in response to other personal motiva-
tions .... [O]ther courts have recognized that the resolution of the
question does not turn on the type of act committed or on the perpe-
trator's emotional baggage accompanying the attack. Rather, these
courts indicate that the focus must be on how the employment relates
to the context in which the commission of the wrongful act arose.
Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244,
249 (Ind. 1989).
80. Indeed, in a case that was factually similar to Cosgrove v. Lawrence,
discussed supra at notes 74-77, the Supreme Court of Alaska abandoned a
strict "motivation to serve" test because it failed to effectuate the purpose of
respondeat superior. See Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344
(Alaska 1990). The Doe court recognized that the test "would too significantly
undercut the enterprise liability basis of the respondeat superior doctrine" be-
cause the employer would not have to include such losses as a cost of its busi-
ness. Id at 349.
81. Under the "implied command" standard employers were never liable
for the intentional torts of their employees because "it could not be implied
that such conduct was ever authorized." PROSSER AND KE=TN, supra note 12,
§ 70, at 505 (footnote omitted). Under the modern standard, however, "inten-
tional torts may be so reasonably connected with the employment as to be
within" the scope of employment. Id
82. Although negligent supervision and hiring are torts separate from re-
spondeat superior, it has been argued that liability based on respondeat supe-
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derived by the employer in the initial grant of authority, such
as when a landlord gives keys to an apartment building man-
ager, these courts require the employer impliedly to command
the sexual assault in order for there to be liability.
The implied command standard is inappropriate and obso-
lete. It was replaced by the "scope of employment" standard
because it did not comport with modern notions of justice;7 3 the
implied command standard allowed employers to avoid liability
simply because they did not impliedly command an assault,
thereby defeating the justification of ensuring that enterprises
pay the costs associated with the risks of their businesses.
Without actually considering whether the assault is a risk of
the employer's business, courts applying the implied command
standard to sexual assaults automatically find no employer lia-
bility. For example, the court in Cosgrove v. Lawrence74 recog-
nized that the sexual misconduct of a therapist "began as a
result, in part, of the mishandling of 'transference,' "75 a psy-
chotherapeutic phenomenon in which a patient projects "feel-
ings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to
represent some person from the patient's past. ' 76 Even though
the assault grew out of legitimate treatment practices, the Cos-
grove court found no employer liability because the defendant
"was not employed to have sexual intercourse with patients."77
Such reasoning is inconsistent with the justification for re-
spondeat superior: "that the employer should be liable for
those faults which may fairly be regarded as risks of his busi-
ness, whether they are committed in furthering it or not. '78
a physician during a gynecological exam, even though the doctor was working
in his "official capacity"); Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 464 (N.C. 1990)
(school principal was acting within the scope of his employment when he
called a student to his office to discuss her truancy, but not within the scope of
his employment when he then sexually assaulted the student).
73. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
74. 520 A.2d 844 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986), aff'd, 522 A.2d 483 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
75. Id at 845.
76. STEDMAN'S MEIcAL DICTboNARY 1622 (25th ed. 1990). In Simmons v.
United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1986), a clinical psychologist testified
that a symbolic parent-child relationship exists in therapy; as the transference
relationship progresses, "the client comes to experience the therapist as a pow-
erful, benevolent parent figure." Id at 1365. Successful transference is there-
fore crucial to the therapeutic process. Id
77. Cosgrove, 520 A.2d at 847.
78. James, supra note 14, at 182. Professor James has criticized the ten-
dency "to overemphasize individual items among these factors at the expense
of underlying principle." Id
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employment, many courts apply the test in a narrow and
mechanical way that ultimately thwarts the justification for re-
spondeat superior.69 The motivation test helps courts deter-
mine whether the employee's actions are job related rather
than personal, but courts frequently err in applying the test on
a specific rather than a general level.70
Courts that require the specific tortious conduct be "moti-
vated to serve" the employer's interest are in effect reverting to
the antiquated "implied command" standard.7 1 This is evident
from modern cases in which courts recognize that the tortious
activity began as a legitimate use of an employee's authority,
but found no liability because of a lack of evidence that the sex-
ual assault was authorized.72 Instead of focusing on the benefit
69. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d
Cir. 1968) (respondeat superior rests on "a deeply rooted sentiment that a busi-
ness enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for accidents which may
fairly be said to be characteristic of its activities. It is in this light that the in-
adequacy of the motive test becomes apparent.").
70. The courts do not seem to have as much difficulty in sexual harass-
ment cases. See Dias v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 919 F.2d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating, in the context of sexual harassment claims, that "the specific egre-
gious act giving rise to an intentional tort claim will itself rarely be 'of a kind
which the employee was hired to perform'; the appropriate inquiry is whether
the employee committed the tort while performing, or in connection with, his
job responsibilities"), vacated on other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 2791 (1991). Other
courts have similarly rejected the claim that, because it is personally moti-
vated, sexual harassment is outside of the scope of employment. See, e.g.,
Horn v. Duke Homes, Div. of Windsor Mobile Homes, Inc., 755 F.2d 599, 604-05
(7th Cir. 1985) (supervisory power used to enable sexual harassment is within
the supervisor's scope of employment and the employer is liable); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 910 (11th Cir. 1982) (in cases of quid pro quo sex-
ual harassment, the employer is liable for the supervisor's conduct because
"the supervisor uses the means furnished to him by the employer to accom-
plish the prohibited purpose"); Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("We conclude that respondeat superior does apply here, where the
action complained- of was that of a supervisor, authorized to hire, fire, disci-
pline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend such actions, even
though what the supervisor is said to have done violates company policy.").
71. According to the implied command standard, employers were liable
for the actions of their employees only if an implied command from general
authority could be inferred. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
72. See Bates v. United States, 701 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1983). In Bates, the
court recognized that the defendant, a military police officer, was on duty, had
authority to detain civilians, and could make arrests "on any and all parts of
the Army base." Id at 739. Although the defendant stopped four teenagers to
question them about a fabricated robbery, the court stated that even if this
was construed to be within the scope of his employment, the ensuing rapes
and murders could not possibly further his employer's business and thus the
employer was not liable. Id. at 742; see also Padilla v. d'Avis, 580 F. Supp. 403,
408-09 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (no employer liability for a sexual assault committed by
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dard, the standard should be applied to all situations involving
sexual assaults by employees. Juries should decide whether the
employee's position assisted the employee in committing the
sexual assault. The court should not simply find respondeat su-
perior inapplicable and refuse to apply the test, as the Califor-
nia Supreme Court did in John R.,98 thereby depriving a jury of
the opportunity to evaluate the impact of job-created authority.
IV. "SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT" SHOULD ENCOMPASS
SEXUAL ASSAULTS MADE POSSIBLE
THROUGH JOB-CREATED POWER,
AUTHORITY, OR ACCESS
Courts should adopt a definition of "scope of employment"
that includes torts committed as a result of and during the ex-
ercise of job-created power or authority. This approach is con-
sistent with some courts' present application of the job-created
power standard.
In addition, "job-created power" should include "job-cre-
ated access"-the power to gain access to the victim which the
employee would not have had in the absence of his position.
Requiring that the employee gain access in a way that the gen-
eral public cannot ensures that the employer is held liable for
costs associated with its enterprise but not for all acts of its em-
ployees. Thus, if the employee could have committed the sex-
ual assault even if not employed, the assault would be
unrelated to employment and not within the "scope of employ-
ment." On the other hand, if solely because of his job the em-
ployee gains access to an area from which the general public is
barred, and if he subsequently uses that access to commit a sex-
ual assault, then his tortious conduct is within the scope of his
employment because he would not have been able to commit
the act but for his status as an employee.
If job-created power is defined in this way, the test differs
from the approach taken by a number of courts because it is ap-
plicable to a broad range of employment situations, not just to
police officers or therapists. For example, it would apply to
plumbers or electricians who gain access to a person's home
through their employment.
The proposed standard best comports with the modern jus-
tification for respondeat superior by ensuring that employers
are held liable for the harms that result from the risks of their
98. John R, 769 P.2d at 955.
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enterprises.9 9 Innocent victims would not bear the entire cost
of an employee's sexual assault. Instead, employers would be
required to take responsibility for the occasions when employ-
ees abuse job-created power. This is justified because employ-
ers derive benefits from the power granted to employees.100
Employers also derive benefits from providing access to em-
ployees. Because the access is part of the job, any misuse of the
access is a cost of doing business, and should therefore be ab-
sorbed by the employer. This standard ensures that employers,
whether businesses or governmental entities, bear the costs of
employee torts when related to employment.
Although courts would move closer to absolute liability by
adopting this standard, imposing liability for sexual assaults
made possible by power acquired through a job is not
equivalent to absolute liability. A sexual assault can occur
without job-created power even though the employee is on
duty. The employer would not be liable in such a case. For ex-
ample, if a gas station attendant sexually assaults a customer
while pumping gas, the assault is not within the scope of his
employment. The attendant has no job-created power over the
customer and he has no job-created access to her because he
could have acted in the same way even if he was not employed
by the gas station.
Conversely, a uniformed police officer in a marked car is
acting within the scope of his employment when he sexually as-
saults a motorist after using the authority of his position to pull
her vehicle over and gain physical control over her. This would
be true whether the officer was on or off duty. If a police of-
ficer is off duty, but uses his gun, badge, and thus the authority
of his position as an officer to sexually assault a person, he is
still using job-created authority in the commission of a tort.1 1
The employer would not be liable, however, for the sexual as-
sault committed by an on-duty undercover police officer if the
officer does not make use of the power of his position. Simi-
larly, a teacher would also be acting within the scope of his em-
ployment if he molests a student and is able to do so because of
the control he has through his position. A school janitor who
assaults a student on a playground, however, would not be act-
ing within the scope of his employment because the tortious
99. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 29, 91-93 and accompanying text.
101. Just as it is a risk for the employer to bear that an on-duty officer may
abuse his power, there is a risk that an off-duty officer will do the same.
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conduct would not be related to power derived from the job.10 2
An apartment building owner who employs a manager and
gives him keys to all apartments would be liable if the em-
ployee uses the key to enter an apartment and sexually assault
a tenant. The employee has access to the apartment because of
his position. Thus, the assault is made possible by the job-cre-
ated power. If, on the other hand, the employee breaks into an
apartment and assaults a tenant, the assault would not be in
the scope of his employment because he was not assisted by his
position and could have done the same thing in the absence of
his employment.10 3
CONCLUSION
Courts are perplexed about whether sexual assaults by em-
ployees are risks that should be allocated to employers. Recent
decisions have taken a more expansive view of what is within
the scope of employment by focusing on whether the tortious
conduct was related to job-created authority or power. Even
these courts, however, have not applied the standard to all
employers.
Courts should adopt the "job-created power" standard and
apply it to all employers. They should define "job-created
power" to include access to victims that employees would not
have had in the absence of their positions. By focusing on job-
created authority, courts will not draw arbitrary and ultimately
contradictory distinctions between different types of employees.
Instead, courts will ensure that employers bear the costs of
their enterprises, thus assuring that employers have an incen-
tive to take preventative measures, that costs are distributed
among the enterprise's beneficiaries, and that innocent victims
of sexual assaults will not also be victimized by lack of financial
redress.
102. This example assumes that the assault did not occur because the
janitor had access to an area that he otherwise would not have had.
103. Similarly, the employer would not be held liable if her employee, a
pizza server, sexually assaults a customer at the restaurant, because the pizza
server could do the same thing even if he was not an employee; the general
public has access to the area. If the pizza server instead delivers the pizza to
the customer's home, gains entry to her house because of his position, and
then sexually assaults the customer, the employer would be liable if it is found
that the employee would not have been able to gain access to the victim but
for his employment position.
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